

AMENDMENT TO RULES COMM. PRINT 119-33

OFFERED BY MR. HILL OF ARKANSAS

In title XV, subtitle C, add at the end the following
new section:

1 **SEC. 15__ . COMPTROLLER GENERAL ASSESSMENT ON**
2 **SHARING OF CYBER INTELLIGENCE WITH**
3 **STATE, LOCAL, TRIBAL, TERRITORIAL, AND**
4 **PRIVATE SECTOR PARTNERS.**

5 (a) ASSESSMENT.—The Comptroller General of the
6 United States shall conduct an assessment of sharing of
7 cyber-related intelligence by the Department of Defense
8 with State, local, Tribal, territorial, and private sector
9 partners.

10 (b) REPORT.—

11 (1) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 60 days after
12 the date on which the Comptroller General completes
13 the assessment under subsection (a), the Comp-
14 troller General shall submit to the Committee on
15 Armed Services of the House of Representatives and
16 the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a
17 report on the results of the assessment.

18 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report under paragraph
19 (1) shall include the following:

1 (A) With respect to each element of the
2 Department of Defense, a summary of the ca-
3 pabilities and practices of the element for shar-
4 ing cyber-related intelligence with State, local,
5 Tribal, territorial, and private sector partners.

6 (B) An assessment of the effects of such
7 sharing, including the timeliness, level of detail,
8 and the degree to which intelligence is provided
9 in a format that allows for technical correlation
10 and network defense actions versus general sit-
11 uational awareness.

12 (C) An assessment of the deconfliction and
13 coordination processes between elements regard-
14 ing such sharing.

15 (D) A description of the role and effective-
16 ness of the Department of Defense in such
17 deconfliction and coordination process.

18 (E) An assessment of how the security
19 clearances of such partners affect such sharing.

20 (F) An assessment of the legal, policy, and
21 infrastructure barriers that prevent cleared pri-
22 vate sector partners from operationalizing clas-
23 sified threat intelligence, including—

24 (i) the lack of accredited, state-run fa-
25 cilities where partners can securely cor-

1 relate classified government-provided indi-
2 cators against their own proprietary net-
3 work data; and

4 (ii) the lack of statutory liability pro-
5 tections (such as State-level tort claims ex-
6 tensions) for private sector entities acting
7 on classified intelligence provided by the
8 government.

9 (G) Recommendations for improvements
10 for such sharing.

